CipherShift365 -- Use Cases
Actors
Human Actors
| ID | Actor | Who they are | Primarily uses |
|---|---|---|---|
| A1 | CISO / Security & Compliance Lead | Accountable for cryptographic inventories and defensible migration roadmaps | Compass outputs |
| A2 | .NET Application Developer | Owns code, dependencies, and configuration | Compass in CI; the Vault SDK |
| A3 | Security Architect / Migration Consultant | Designs and delivers the migration engagement | All three modules + consulting wrapper |
| A4 | Platform / DevOps / SRE Engineer | Operates build pipelines and runtime monitoring | Guardian (gate, listener, SIEM) |
| A5 | Procurement / Supplier-Assurance Officer | Receives or demands assurance evidence | The exported inventory (CBOM) |
Supporting System Actors
| ID | System | Role |
|---|---|---|
| S1 | CI/CD system (Azure DevOps, GitHub Actions) | Hosts discovery scan and build-time gate |
| S2 | SIEM (Microsoft Sentinel, Splunk, Elastic) | Receives Guardian alerts and events |
| S3 | NuGet / package feed | Source of third-party dependencies |
| S4 | Knowledge Base update service | Delivers signed, versioned KB |
| S5 | Certificate & configuration stores | Inputs Compass parses |
| S6 | APM agent | Must coexist with Guardian listener |
Use-Case Inventory
| ID | Use case | Primary actor | Module |
|---|---|---|---|
| UC-D-01 | Run a cryptographic discovery scan of a .NET solution | A2 / A3 | Discover |
| UC-D-02 | Produce a standards-compliant cryptographic inventory (CBOM) | A1 / A3 | Discover |
| UC-D-03 | Generate a prioritised, costed migration plan | A1 / A3 | Discover |
| UC-D-04 | Read the human-readable risk report | A1 | Discover |
| UC-D-05 | Run discovery as an automated step inside CI/CD | A2 / A4 | Discover |
| UC-D-06 | Export the inventory for supplier / customer assurance | A5 | Discover |
| UC-D-07 | Re-scan incrementally and diff against prior inventory | A2 / A3 | Discover |
| UC-M-01 | Adopt the crypto-agile SDK in an application | A2 | Migrate |
| UC-M-02 | Change algorithm or provider without recompiling | A2 / A4 | Migrate |
| UC-M-03 | Enable hybrid (classical + post-quantum) mode | A2 / A3 | Migrate |
| UC-M-04 | Rotate keys and manage deprecation windows by config | A4 | Migrate |
| UC-M-05 | Operate on unsupported platform via graceful fallback | A2 | Migrate |
| UC-G-01 | Establish a monitoring baseline from the inventory | A3 / A4 | Guard |
| UC-G-02 | Block new quantum-vulnerable cryptography at build time | A4 / A2 | Guard |
| UC-G-03 | Monitor running applications via a managed listener | A4 | Guard |
| UC-G-04 | Detect drift between live state and the baseline | A4 | Guard |
| UC-G-05 | Send alerts and events to the SIEM | A4 | Guard |
Detailed Use Cases (Selected)
UC-D-01 -- Run a cryptographic discovery scan
Goal: Find every place cryptography is used across source, dependencies, certificates, and configuration.
Main flow:
- Actor runs Compass as a
dotnetglobal tool against a solution. - Compass performs semantic code analysis (understanding what the code actually does, not just matching text).
- Compass walks the dependency tree and parses certificates and config files.
- Compass classifies each finding by role (key exchange, signature, symmetric, hash, MAC, KDF, RNG) and by parameters (key size, mode, curve).
- Compass assigns a quantum-risk level using the knowledge base.
Outcome: A complete set of classified findings, ready for CBOM (UC-D-02), plan (UC-D-03), and report (UC-D-04).
UC-M-01 -- Adopt the crypto-agile SDK
Goal: Let developers call cryptography through a stable, algorithm-agnostic interface.
Main flow:
- Developer codes against interfaces (
IKem,ISignature,ISymmetric) without naming a concrete algorithm. - Vault delegates to a trusted provider -- never a re-implemented primitive.
Outcome: Application code that does not have to change when the algorithm does.
UC-G-02 -- Block vulnerable cryptography at build time
Goal: Stop regressions before they ship.
Main flow:
- Guardian runs the shared Compass analysis engine as a build-time gate.
- A build that introduces quantum-vulnerable cryptography fails; a clean build passes.
Outcome: The codebase cannot quietly slide backwards.